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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
power to act as he did because no such power is conferred on him by the
state constitution or any statute.
The majority felt that since the Feinberg Law did not point out the means
to be used to accomplish its purpose and did not purport to stand outside
the scope of the Commissioner's authority, the Commissioner of Education is
empowered under Section 310 to regulate the execution of the Feinberg Law
so long as his rulings are not purely arbitrary.
Teachers have a duty as citizens to cooperate in expelling subversive
persons from our educational system, a duty which Judge Burke felt was
superior to the speculative reasons for the Commissioner's ruling in this
instance. If performance of that duty is to be enforced under the Feinberg
Law without the Commissioner's discretionary intervention, the legislature and
not the Court of Appeals must so direct.

FAILURE TO APPEAL rROM ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING PREVENTS FURTHER RAIsING OF ISSUE
On the review of an Appellate Division decision, the Court of Appeals is
generally limited in its consideration to the issues raised in the Appellate
Division. In Berke v. Scleckter' 9 the Court applied this rule to a petitioner
in an Article 78 proceeding who did not appeal from a trial court order,20 one
portion of which was adverse to his interests. The Court held that he could
not obtain review of the portion not appealed by contesting the Appellate
Division's 'decision on a different point which had been appealed by the
respondent in the original proceeding.
Petitioner sought review of the New York City Civil Service Commission's
action in removing his name from the eligible list for patrolmen on the ground
that he was not a person of good character. 2 ' The Trial Court tried only the
issue of whether petitioner's name had been placed on the eligible list. However, it dismissed the proceeding on the merits and granted petitioner leave
to apply to the Commission de novo and in the event of denial at that time, the
right to reapply for judicial review.
The petitioner did not appeal the dismissal on the merits. The respondent
Commission appealed the second portion of the order, and the Appellate
Division reversed that portion,22 holding that the leave to apply de novo
amounted to judicial extension of the statute of limitations for an Article 78
23
proceeding.
The majority (5) in the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's
19. 5 N.Y.2d 569, 186 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1959).

20. N.Y. Civ. PRc. AcT art. 78.
21. N.Y. City Civil Service Commission RuLas, Rule III § 7:
Character: Whenever the Commission shall find that a candidate has
an unsatisfactory character or reputation, he shall be marked "not quali-

fied" and his name shall be withheld from certification. The burden of

proving good character shall be upon the candidate.
22. Berke v. Schechter, 5 A.D.2d 350, 171 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1st Dep't 1958).
23. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac § 1286.
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reversal, but did not consider the dismissal on the merits because that issue
had not been before the Appellate Division. The minority (2) dissented on
the ground that the Appellate Division's reversal of the leave to apply de novo
altered the effect of the dismissal by making it conclusive of the entire matter,
which it had not been previously. Because of the change in the effect of the
dismissal the minority felt that that issue was before them and that the case
should have been remanded for a full hearing on the merits, which hearing
had not been given on the original trial.
Both in New York and in other jurisdictions, it is clear that a party
must raise an issue in an intermediate appellate court in order to preserve
that issue for determination in a higher court.2 4 On its face the minority's
contention that the Appellate Division decision effected the dismissal on the
merits and thus brought that issue before the Court of Appeals, is appealing.
However, at the time of the Commission's appeal the petitioner could have
foreseen the effects of a reversal on the question of reapplication. At that time
by choosing not to appeal the dismissal on the merits, he waived his right
to litigate the issue further. Such a result may seem unduly technical, but
it is historically accepted and probably necessary to an orderly system of
appellate review.
MANDAmus-A DISCRETIONARY REMEDY

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedial device which is granted only after
the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 25 Since it is a discretionary remedy,
it is difficult to set out any definitive standard wherein its issuance is assured.
However, there appear to be two circumstances that will cause the Court to
deny the remedy: (1) first, where the order would cause disorder and confusion
in public affairs; 26 (2) and second, where there is a more appropriate remedy
27
available
In Ahern v. Board of Supervisors,2 8 the Board of Supervisors of Suffolk
County appointed a Democratic Election Commissioner without the appointee
having been recommended by the Chairman of the Democratic Committee as
required by Subdivision 2 of Section 52 of the Election Law.2 9 The Chairman
24. Stack v. Nat'l City Bank, 278 N.Y. 388, 394, 16 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1938);
In re 43d Ave., 282 N.Y. 42, 47, 24 N.E.2d 841, 842 (1939); In re Segall's Will, 287
N.Y. 52, 60, 38 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1941); Bank of Ariz. v. Thomas Heavy Co., 232 U.S.
106, 110 (1913); Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 III. 196, 172
N.E. 35 (1930); Stafford v. Stafford, 299 Ill. 438, 132 N.E. 452 (1921); Cline v. Niblo,
117 Tex. 474, 8 S.W.2d 633 (1928).
25. Andresen v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 14 N.E.2d 65 (1938); Duncan Townsite Co. v.
Lane, 245 U.S. 308 (1917).
26. Andresen v. Rice, supra note 25.
27. Walsh v. LaGuardia, 269 N.Y. 437, 199 N.E. 652 (1936); In re Gardner, 68
N.Y.467 (1877).
28. 6 N.Y.2d 376, 189 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1959).
29. N.Y. ELECTON LAW § 52(2) provides that:
At least five days before the first day of January in each odd numbered
year . . . the respective chairman of the county committees of each
of the two political parties . . . shall certify the name of a person
who is recommended as a fit and proper person to be appointed a commissioner of elections.

